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PROFESSIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES
JOHN

E.

DONALDSON

Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Vice-President,
College of William and Mary
I would like to talk to you today concerning recent important developments in the tax treatment of professional and educational expenses. My remarks will be largely focused on the subject of deductible
treatment of educational expenses of professional persons. The spring
from which all the law on this subject flows is Section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. That section does not mention the
term "educational expenses." To best understand recent developments,
an awareness of the early history of the treatment of educational expenses is helpful.
Prior to 1950, the Revenue Service and the courts were almost
unanimous in regarding collegiate training as being beyond the scope
of deductibility under Section 162. Cases during this period, however,
did allow deductions for expenses of attending institutes and special
programs in one's field. The dominant theme in this period was that
expenses of collegiate training were personal or capital in nature and
therefore non-deductible.
The first major break favoring the taxpayer relative to the treatment
of the expenses of collegiate training was Hill vs. Commissioner, 181
Fed. 2d 906, (4th Cir. 1950). This circuit court decision involved a
Virginia school teacher who had attended summer session at a college
in order to improve her skills as a teacher. Reversing the Tax Court,
the circuit court held that her expenses in attending summer session
of a college were deductible because ordinary and necessary in her
trade or business. Although the revenue service by a ruling in 1951
accepted the doctrine developed in the Hill case, it was 1958 before
regulations under Section 162 dealing with the treatment of educational
expenses were finalized.
These regulations, adopted in 1958, in large measure covered the
treatment of educational expenses until 1967, when they were substantially revised through the issuance of new regulations. The 1958
regulations covered the subject with a double thrust. First, they provided for allowance of deductions for educational expenses incurred
to maintain or improve skills or to meet employment requirements
prescribed as a condition to retention of employment status. Secondly,
they provided express disallowance of deductions for educational expenses incurred for the purpose of pursuing a new trade or business,
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obtaining a new position, gaining a substantial advancement in position,
or acquiring a specialty, within one's profession.
It is important in understanding the inadequacy of the 1958 regulations to understand that these regulations, in their administration, were
geared in large part to a determination of subjective intention of the
taxpayer. For example, the taxpayer, in order to prevail in litigation
under these regulations, had the burden of proving that his purpose in
incurring the expenses in question was to maintain or improve skills or
to meet standards prescribed by his employer. The presence of a purpose to obtain a new position or to advance general knowledge for
personal reasons would result in disallowance of the deductions.
The 1958 regulations, being based in large measure on subjective
tests and criteria, invited litigation and dispute and it was forthcoming
in tremendous volume. Because of the relatively small amounts of money
involved in the disallowance of claims deductions, a pattern developed
of pro se representation by taxpayers in settlement procedures within
the Revenue Service and before the Tax Court, with all of the attendant
difficulties inherent in situations where laymen represent themselves in
complex legal proceedings.
Because the volume of litigation was heavy as a consequence of the
impreciseness of the 1958 regulations and because of development in
the case law which expanded and contradicted the rules in these regulations, it was fitting that they be reconsidered. On July 7, 1966, new
proposed regulations pertaining to the deductibility of educational expenses were issued. These proposals were restrictive in tone and explicit
in denying deductions in a number of situations not covered in the 1958
regulations. The hue and cry that followed the publications of the
July 7, 1966, proposals was sufficient to bring about their withdrawal
and the issuance of revised proposed regulations on October 1, 1966.
With some changes, these proposals were finalized as treasury regulations on May 1, 1967.
By way of general comparison between the 1967 regulations and the
1958 regulations, the 1967 regulations were less restrictive in tone and
application than their predecessor's provisions and employ the device
of objective relationship rather than subjective intent in determining
deductibility. Accordingly, it would appear that the present regulations
should be easier to administer. Whether they have the effect of curtailing litigation under the deduction of educational expenses remains
to be seen, and it is probable that certain key provisions in the 1967
regulations will soon be challenged in the courts.
Before turning to the treatment of specific classes and types of expenses, it is well to note that the 1958 regulations are still with us,
The revenue service ruled in May of 1968 (Rev. Ruling 68-97) that
the 1967 regulations need not be used to dispose of cases and claims
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for refunds and in assessing deficiencies for years beginning prior to
January 1, 1968. Accordingly, for a year beginning prior to January 1,
1968, a taxpayer may rely upon either the old or the new regulations.
If he has a strong case on subjective intention to improve skills, he may
prefer to rely on the earlier regulations. If the more liberal treatment
in some areas of the 1967 regulations is advantageous to him, he may
rely on these.
Although the general tone of the 1967 regulations is liberal and less
restrictive, there is one change of major proportions that is quite restrictive in nature. Under a prior law the expenses that qualify one for
a new trade or business were deductible, in the view of the courts, if
not in the view of the Service, if the taxpayer's purpose in incurring
those expenses was to improve or maintain needed skills in existing
employment or trade or business. Under the 1958 regulations a number
of courts held that accountants and revenue agents could properly deduct
the cost of a legal education. As revised, the regulations are no longer
vague concerning deductibility of expenses that both qualify for a new
trade or business and yet are appropriate to the maintenance or improvement of skills in present employment. The regulations flatly provide that no deductions shall be allowed for expenses of education that
qualify a person for a new trade or business. Thus, it appears that one's
intention to use his education in existing employment or business is of
no consequence under the revised regulations. The deduction will be
disallowed notwithstanding the taxpayers intent.
Considering that a body of case law has developed permitting taxpayers who demonstrate an intention of using legal education in present
employment, rather than in pursuing a new trade or business, to deduct
the expenses of such education, it requires no prophetic skills to
anticipate that this change in the 1967 regulations will be challenged
and that there will be some time before the law in this area is settled.
An apparent liberalization in the 1967 regulations relates to expenditures which qualify a person for a new position or for substantial
advancement in present position. The 1958 regulations provided that
expenses incurred for the purpose of attaining a new position or gaining substantial advancement in position were not deductible. This
restrictive language in the 1958 regulations is omitted from the 1967
regulations. However, there is no substitute language in the 1967
regulations. It is possible to infer an intention to retreat from the 1958
position but difficult to determine how far the retreat has gone. It is
clear, however, that if the new position or advanced position takes one
into a new trade or business, that the expenses are not deductible under
the Regulations. Fortunately for the taxpayer, the 1967 regulations employ an expanded concept of what constitutes one's present trade or
business. For example, a high school English teacher that takes courses
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for the purpose of becoming a history teacher, a principal, or a guidance counselor, is regarded under the regulations as being within his
original trade or business and the expenditures may be deducted.
Another area where changes were made is in the provision dealing
with improvement of skills. Under the 1958 regulations, educational
expense deductions were allowed where the purpose of the education
was to maintain or improve skills within one's trade, business or employment. The 1958 regulations limited the deductions to cases where
the expenditures are "customary." The same basic provisions in the
1958 regulations are carried forward but the limitation of "customary"
expenditures is deleted. Seemingly, the taxpayer no longer need show
convincingly that his decision to take courses to improve his skills is
one customarily made within his calling by persons similarly situated.
By way of clarification, but without changing the law, the regulations
expressly provide that "refresher" courses in one's area of business or
professional interest and "current development" courses in such areas
are courses the expenses of which are deductible.
The thrust of the new regulations is to downgrade the element of
"purpose" in pursuing education that improves one's skills and to
focus on the question of whether or not the education in fact improves
one's skills. However, a taxpayer can not be assured that the expenses
incurred in courses which improve his skills will be deductible where
such courses also advance his general knowledge. In James A. Carroll,
51 TC, No. 22, Filed October 31, 1968, the taxpayer was a policeman
who enrolled in a baccalaureate degree program at DePaul University.
The police department encouraged him to do so and arranged for him
to be excused from rotation duty assignments which would have confficted with his class attendance. The taxpayer attempted to show that
an educated police officer is a more effective and valuable police officer
and that his purpose was to improve his skills as a policeman. The
Tax Court, in disallowing his claimed deductions had the benefit of
knowing his later activities, including completion of the B.A. degree
with a concentration in philosophy, resignation from the police department and enrollment in law school. Finding that the taxpayer
lacked the requisite purpose to improve skills under the 1958 regulations, and acknowledging the applicability of the 1967 regulations,
the court examined the taxpayer's case in the light of the latter regulations. It observed:
"By their terms, they do not require the taxpayer to establish his
primary purpose in undertaking the education. However, in our
opinion, the new regulations do not allow a deduction for educational expenses when the education is inherently personal and not
proximate to the job activities of the taxpayer. Having previously
discussed these issues and found that the education undertaken by
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the petitioner was of an inherently personal nature and only
tenuously related to his employment, we find that the 1967 regulations do not allow the deduction claimed by the petitioner."
The essence of the majority holding appears to be that even if the
general studies in a B.A. program improved his skills as a policeman,
that such expenses were inherently personal and therefore not deductible.
Four judges dissented rather strongly. In a dissent by Judge Hoyt with
Judges Faye and Maroney concurring, the following conclusion was
drawn:
"Even if the expense was of a sort generally regarded as personal,
it was for education which improved petitioner's skills in his then
existing employment as a police officer and not within the exceptions spelled out by the regulations making only certain specific
expenses of this type non-deductible."
Because of the division in the Tax Court, it is likely that the case
will be appealed. Under the improvement and maintenance of skills
tests as contained in the new regulations, James A. Carroll focuses on
the central weakness; namely, what degree of direct relationship to
employment is necessary for education expenses to be deducted and
what degree of personal, non-business benefit associated with the
education obtained is sufficient to foreclose deductible treatment?
Somewhat related to questions involved in the provision relating to
maintenance of skills is the question of whether expenses of education
which qualify one to be a specialist within his profession are deductible.
Under the 1958 regulations, the tenor of the rules was to deny deductions for expenses which tended to qualify a person for a specialty
within his profession. For example, the 1968 regulations contained an
illustration which expressly provided that a physician could not deduct
expenses of taking a course in pediatrics. The 1967 regulations omitted
that example, leaving the inference that a liberalization is intended.
Further evidence of liberalization for expenses of specialty training is
found in the new example which provides that the expenses of a
psychiatrist in taking courses that qualify him to be a psychoanalyst
are deductible. While the regulations do not expressly provide that
expenses of training for a specialty are deductible, the deletion of a
hostile example contained in the 1958 regulations, coupled with the
addition of the generous example in the 1967 regulations, enables one
to argue that this is intended.
More than any other professional class, the teaching profession is
singled out for specific treatment in the 1967 regulations. The treatment accorded is generally favorable. The principle in the 1967 regulations that minimum educational expenses for employment are not
deductible is rather specifically defined in relation to the teaching
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profession. For teachers in higher education, a person is deemed to
have met minimum education requirements for his position when he
becomes a member of the faculty. A person for the purpose of this
rule, is regarded as becoming a faculty member, if one of three things
occurs:
(1) he has tenure or his service counts toward tenure,
(2) the institution contributes to his retirement fund, or
(3) he can vote at faculty meetings.
These rules are alternative, not cumulative. If the taxpayer is employed by an institution as a teacher and can vote in faculty meetings,
he is regarded as having met minimum education requirements even
though he lacks tenure. If the obtaining of a doctorate is required for
tenure, his expenses of education to obtain the doctorate, incurred
after his faculty appointment, are deductible. It would appear that the
examples in the regulations providing deductibility when an elementary
school teacher takes courses permitting her to become a secondary
school teacher, high school counselor, or principal are equally applicable to the college teacher who desires to change his field of teaching
competence or seek a position in college administration.
As to public school teachers, the minimum educational requirement
rules are less clear in application. The regulations provide, for example,
that where a taxpayer has a bachelor's degree and both a bachelor's
degree and 30 hours of educational courses are required to be a secondary school teacher, one with a degree but lacking the additional
30 hours of education courses who is permitted to teach will be regarded as having met minimum requirements and the cost of obtaining
the additional educational courses required will be deductible. However,
in a similar situation, if one is hired without a bachelor's degree where
rules require the teacher to hold a bachelor's degree, the taxpayer will
be regarded as not having met minimum requirements.
The 1958 regulations took the position, particularly for teachers,
that travel expenditures are generally personal in nature and are nondeductible. The rules of the 1958 regulations were liberalized somewhat in Revenue Ruling 64-176 and the 1967 regulations reflect
generally the less restrictive approach of the ruling. The thrust of the
1967 regulations is that travel expenditures are deductible if directly
related to duties of one's trade, business, or employment. The test of
the relationship is whether a major portion of the travel period was
directly related to maintaining or improving the taxpayer's skills. If so,
the travel expenses are deductible except to the extent reflected in travel
for personal convenience. For example, if a teacher were to travel from
the East Coast to California to take summer courses, and dedicated a
major portion of her activities to improving her skills as a teacher
through course work in California, the round trip to and from California
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would be deductible. However, the expenses of weekend excursions
undertaken for the purpose of sunbathing or relaxation while in California would not be deductible. If only a small portion of the summer
spent in California was related to course work directly related to improvement of skills, none of the travel expenditures, including the round
trip to California, would be deductible.
The problem of deductibility of educational expenses in the context
of the "carrying on of trade or business" requirement in Section 162
received no attention in the 1958 regulations and no attention in the
1967 regulations. However, Revenue Ruling 60-97 provides that when
the taxpayer is not actively engaged in his trade, business or employment at the time the educational expenses are incurred, they are not
expenses ordinary and necessary to the carrying on of any trade or
business. Implicit in this ruling is the requirement that the taxpayer
have active trade, business or employment status at the time the expenses are incurred in order for them to be deductible. This position
apparently continues to be the position of the Revenue Service under
the 1967 regulations, and was argued in the case of Furner vs. Commissioner, 7th Circuit, February, 1968, reversing 47 TC 165. The 7th
Circuit rejected the government's position that educational expenses
are deductible only if employment status is continuing. In Furner, the
taxpayer, a junior high school teacher with a bachelor's degree, resigned
her position with the local school system in order to attend Northwestern University as a full-time graduate student. She deducted her
graduate expenses and on receiving her Master's degree took employment in a different school system in another locality. The 7th Circuit
said:
"The Commissioner and Tax Court put too much emphasis, we
think, on whether the course of study displaces performance of
teaching activity during the period of the year when it is traditional
for teachers to teach, and give insufficient consideration to the
broader question whether the relationship of the course of study
to intended future performance as a teacher is such that the expenses thereof can reasonably be considered ordinary and necessary in carrying on the business of teaching."
This approach, if adopted in other circuits, could result in substantial
tax savings to a large sector of the teaching profession and perhaps
other professions as well.
In conclusion, because of the significant changes in treatment effected
by the new educational expense regulations, they merit close attention
and study. While they generally reflect the development of case law
since 1958, they are, in several aspects, more restrictive. It remains
to be seen whether they substantially reduce litigation in the educational
expense area.

